

Mobility, Migration and Its Discontents: Insights from Nigeria

Franca Attah, PhD

Department of Sociology University of Lagos Akoka-Yaba, Lagos

ABSTRACT: The paper interrogates the phenomenon of mobility, migration and its discontent using insights from Nigeria. International migration is a growing phenomenon both in its range and complexity. The United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs estimates that there are over 214 million international migrants worldwide representing three per cent of the global population. The growing trend is from developing economies and countries in conflict to the developed countries of the world. The social, economic and political underpinnings are diverse and often not manifest even though they could be linked to globalization. These factors include the asymmetry in the international political order, demand for cheap labour in the developed countries, ease of international transportation and availability of information technology. In addition, countries such as Nigeria have developed strong kinship networks in Europe and America. Fundamentally, what impels decision to migrate is not unconnected with unemployment and the need to achieve better well being. However, migration has generated a myriad of discontent both in countries of origin and destination as many developed countries perceive migrants as responsible for some social problems such as crime, terrorism and growing youth unemployment. Using library resources and online materials, and anchoring the analysis on Caldwell's theory of Intergenerational Wealth-flow and Political Economy theories, the paper avers that migrants discontent stems from their inability to be fully integrated in host countries and given rights and opportunities to earn legitimate livelihood. The paper concludes that Nigerians have been singled out for xenophobic attacks in countries such as South Africa, Libya, even sold as slaves and disparaged in some other countries. Flowing from the discourse the paper recommends the bridging of the inequality gap between countries to avoid brain drain and waste.

Key Words: Migration, Globalization, International Political Order, Asymmetry, Xenophobia.

Date of Submission: 11-03-2019

Date of acceptance: 28-03-2019

I. INTRODUCTION

International migration is the movement of people from one country to another for the purpose of employment. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that over one hundred million people are working in countries other than their country of birth (ILO, 2011). It posits that labour migration is a key feature of globalization with migrant workers earning over US\$440 billion in 2011 and the World Bank informs that over US\$350 billion was transferred to developing countries as remittances (ILO, 2011). However, it is evidenced that many migrants are vulnerable to a myriad of challenges in their host countries including xenophobia and of recent slavery. The factors responsible for migration include social, economic, and demographic inequalities whether in terms of quest for education, employment, resources or human rights issues. Population dynamics are responsible for many of these inequalities. For (DESA, 2015), the rise in global population especially in third world countries has engendered developmental challenges such as high unemployment, poverty and illiteracy thus putting a lot of pressure on the lean resources of such countries. On the contrary the population of the developed countries is growing minimally due to declining fertility resulting in a shrink in working-age populations and a rise in aging population. For instance, 50 per cent was above 50 years by 2011 (US Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2011). And in China, by 2050, 31 per cent of the work force will be over 60 years. By 2020, 65 per cent of Japan's work force will be above 50 years. The European Union on its part estimates a deficit of 42 to 70 million people from (2018). To counterbalance these trends such countries have initiated migration policies such as VISA Lotteries to cushion the effects of declining working-age population. In Nigeria, migration both licit and illicit came to the fore due to macroeconomic imbalance in the 1980s resulting in over one thousand per cent depreciation of the national currency (the Naira). And recently, the economic recession of 2015 impelled another migratory wave resulting in a myriad of deaths for migrants both in the Sahara desert and in the Mediterranean Sea while those intending to cross from Libya to Europe are being auctioned as slaves (CNN, November 17, 2017). The first migratory wave of the 1980s was both educated and uneducated Nigerians to the developed economies of the West in search of better well-being. The second migratory wave of the 21st Century comprises agile young men and nubile maidens traveling to Europe both by land and air. The paper is divided into five sections. Section one comprises the introduction and

the statement of the problem. Section two conceptualizes the key concepts while anchoring the discourse on Caldwell's wealth flow and political Economy theories. Section three interrogates migration as a component of underdevelopment and globalization whereas section four x-rays the current challenges in migration. Section five concludes the discourse with some recommendations.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The migration equation is both complex and dynamic as attention had often been focused on income disparity between countries and population pressures. Even though migration is often viewed as voluntary, it can also be forced. The decision to migrate is considered forced when the migrants do not 'feel' they have a choice in their migration decision. In such situations, like during severe hardship, conflict situations or persecution, people leaving their previous place of residence might not be a 'choice' but essentially due to lack of opportunities or political and social infrastructure required for survival (Schapendonk, 2011). As such, migration is primarily a response to real and perceived inequalities in socio-economic opportunities that are themselves a result of dependent and/or uneven sectoral and regional development. Schapendonk concludes that a major influence on migration has been sweeping changes in expectations over what constitutes a satisfactory standard of living, a desirable occupation and a suitable mix of accessible services and amenities, as well as survival. Besides, social influences on migration are also considered important, especially in terms of access to education and health services; such social influences are in turn often a function of economic issues (Schapendonk, 2011). Furthermore, whether is internal or international migration, it is known that migration has a profound effect on economic development, which could be negative or positive (de Haas, 2010). For instance: Brain drain occurs when significant numbers of highly skilled nationals leave their countries of origin to seek employment or establish businesses abroad. It has a negative effect on the economies of developing countries, because the skills of the remaining nationals are not sufficient to grow industries, academia and other sectors of the economy. Brain waste occurs when skilled migrants engage in menial occupations abroad, resulting in deskilling. While, brain gain can be achieved through the return of individuals who gained skills abroad through temporary migration. Thus, the challenge for any government is to curtail or reverse brain drain, or at the very least mitigate its effects on social and economic development, while optimising brain gain and minimising brain waste of nationals abroad (Zoomers & Nijenhuis, 2012). The new migratory wave of this Century where young Nigerians trying to cross into Europe are sold as slaves is a good example of brain drain. The questions arise as to: a. whether underdevelopment is a trigger for migration? b. Does migration impede development? c. Does globalization engender migration? d. Does migration engender discontent? The answers to the above puzzles are discussed in subsequent sections.

III. CONCEPTUALIZING MOBILITY AND MIGRATION

Migration is a complex and multidimensional process which involves diverse motivations, with far-reaching impacts or consequences to the individual and the places of origin and destination. Perhaps that is why (Massey et al.1993) conceive of migration as the temporary or permanent move of individuals or groups of people from one geographic location to another for various reasons ranging from better employment possibilities to persecution.

The status of migrants can either be regular where residency is in tandem with the laws of the host country, or irregular. The International Organisation on Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as a migration that takes place outside the norms and procedures established by States to manage the orderly flow of migrants into, through or out of their territories (Carling, 2006). Similarly, Koser (2010) states that irregular migration generally refers to the cross-border flow of people from one country to another without proper authorisation. In other literature, irregular migration is also expressed as 'clandestine', 'undocumented' or 'illegal' migration flow from one country to another (Skeldon, 2002). However, there is no universally accepted definition of irregular migration as the complex nature of irregular migration is bound to the social and political systems of place of origin and destination states. Smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons are the most discussed issues in the literature about irregular migration. Both are seen as an illegal form of migration and a transnational crime (Burke, 2008).

Moreover, although migration is often viewed as voluntary, it can also be forced. The decision to migrate is considered forced when the migrants do not 'feel' they have a choice in their migration decision. In such situations, like during severe hardship, or where there is conflict or persecution, people leaving their previous place of residence might not be a 'choice' but essentially due to lack of opportunities or political and social infrastructure required for survival (Schapendonk, 2011). Whether it is internal or international migration, it is known that migration has a profound effect on economic development, which could be negative or positive (De Haas, 2010). For instance, brain drain occurs when significant numbers of highly skilled nationals leave their countries of origin to seek employment or establish businesses abroad. It has a negative effect on the economies of developing countries, because the skills of remaining nationals are not sufficient to

grow industries, academia and other sectors of the economy. Brain waste occurs when skilled migrants engage in menial occupations abroad, resulting in deskilling. While, brain gain can be achieved through the return of individuals who gained skills abroad through temporary migration. Thus, the challenge for any government is to curtail or reverse brain drain, or at the very least mitigate its effects on social and economic development, while optimising brain gain and minimising brain waste of nationals abroad (Zoomers & Nijenhuis, 2012).

The current migratory wave of young Africans including Nigerians has brought to the fore Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo’s views on aid and dependency in Africa. Addressing the French President Emmanuel Macron in Accra he averred “that we can no longer make policy on the basis of aid support from the western world or Europe. It has not worked and it will not work” (Akufo-Addo, December 4, 2017). The above narrative was in response to a question on whether France would extend its aid to non-francophone countries. It is imperative that in spite of the various aids received, that African countries continue to experience macro-economic imbalance resulting in economic recession, acute unemployment and palpable poverty. This has been the genesis of the new migratory wave where young people die in the deserts, drown in the Mediterranean Sea or are sold as slaves in Libya.

IV. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Theories of migration attempt to provide answers to the questions of why do people migrate? and what perpetuates migration? As such, there are significant body of theories of migration, and they spread across different theoretical views and practical concerns. However, they all more or less rest on the assumptions of the cause – effects dynamics of migration in the origin – destination. Thus, integrating these ideas, a quadrant on the dynamics of migration can be deduced (see figure 1).

		<i>CAUSES</i>	<i>EFFECTS</i>
DESTINATION	ORIGIN	1. poverty, unemployment, war, unrest, economic depression	3. Brain drain, investments, productivity
	DESTINATION	2. Employment, safety, migration policies, language.	4. Infrastructural burdens, wages of natives, job opportunities, safety.

Figure 1: Migration Quadrant

Source: adapted from Mabogunje, 1970 & Massey et al, 1993.

The first of the quadrant emphasises the social and economic predisposing factors in the migrants’ milieu which causes the need for migration (e.g. poverty, unemployment, war and unrest, etc.). The second examines the elements that facilitate choice of where to migrate to (e.g. employment, safety, migration policies, language, etc.). This is often considered the push and pull factors cum causes that encourage migration (Mabogunje, 1970; Massey at al., 1993). The third quadrant is concerned with the effects of migration on the origin country (human capital and infrastructural availability – brain drain, investments, productivity, etc.), while the fourth examines the effects migration have on the host (e.g. Infrastructural burdens, wages of natives, job opportunities, safety, etc.). Whilst, migration theories often fall within the context of some form of ‘push–pull’ model, where the relocation decision is seen as being affected by factors that push movers away from previous residential locations and pull them to current locations (De Haas, 2010). Significantly also, these

theories can be seen as comprising of decisions based on a combination of economic and behavioural explanation. Given the complexity of migration, it has been argued that in contemporary migration analysis, we need to understand the dynamics of globalisation and read different meanings into the notion of the push and pull context (Raghuram, 2009). Hence the need to look at Caldwell's Intergenerational Wealth-flow and the Political Economy theories. Caldwell in his theory posits that fertility in any society is rational and high if children are economically useful to parents. The economic benefit of the children to the parents is determined by social conditions mainly the direction of the intergenerational flow of wealth that is in terms of goods and services. This flow of wealth is usually from the younger generation to the older generation. Children in such societies are perceived as economic assets and more children means that more wealth will accrue to the parents resulting in pronatalism. Fertility will remain high as long as the flow favours the older generation. There are six advantages to parents where wealth flows from children to parents.

1. The head of the household gains when the family size is large.
2. Children form part of the labour force leading to greater productivity and more wealth.
3. Adult children assist their parents by working in the farms as labourers.
4. They contribute to family ceremonies such as marriages, funerals, births, community festivals etc.
5. Grown up children look after their aged parents.
6. Parents can invest in the education and training of the children to increase the ability of the children to make higher returns. When the direction of wealth-flow changes that is from parents to children low fertility becomes rational. (Caldwell, 1976). The imperative is that pronatalism is favoured in agrarian societies where polygyny is practiced. Children provide cheap labour on their parents' farms and are instruments for acquisition of wealth by their parents. In Nigeria, over 70 per cent of the population without western education found in agriculture and the informal sector favour large family size as children are considered as assets and a form of insurance against old age. Children are impelled into migration to improve family fortunes (see Attoh, 2009, 2010 and 2011). For a fact in states considered as hubs for trafficking in persons such as Edo State, heads of households impel their young nubile daughters to embark on illicit migration to generate wealth for the family.

Political economy, the intersection of economics, sociology and politics is the foundation of modern social sciences and focus of sociologists such as Max Weber, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Political economy simply defined is the science of laws that govern the production and exchange of the material means of subsistence in human society. In Nigeria, as a result of the economic reforms in 1986 by the then President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida both the public and private sectors embarked on massive rationalization of their work force (see Attoh, 2009) resulting in massive unemployment. In addition, the vacillating effects of structural adjustment programme (SAP) and the depreciation of the national currency prompted a variety of migratory movements both licit and illicit to Europe and America for better well-being. For Nigeria as well as other African nations, Mabogunje avers that the effect of selective and unequal urban development and the growing disparity between rural and urban areas is the reason why people migrate from the former to the latter (Mabogunje, 1970); the same mechanism pushes Africans to Europe and America. Continuing from Mabogunje's suppositions, Massey and colleagues noted that in developed countries, risks to household income are generally minimised through private insurance markets or governmental programmes, but in developing countries these institutional mechanisms for managing risk are imperfect, absent, or inaccessible to poor individuals and families, giving them incentives to diversify risks through migration (Massey et al., 1993). Massey et al. therefore considered migration as a household decision, and if we derive some conclusion from these, we can understand that, individuals and households try to control the risks to the family's wellbeing through different allocations of available resources; where labour resources of the household may also be re-allocated based on the risky situation. For (Todaro, Alabi, 2016), the irony is that despite the prospect of better employment opportunity being the main driving force behind migration into the urban areas, one of the major consequences of rapid urbanisation process is acute unemployment, precipitated by the influx of job seekers from the rural areas into both the formal and informal sectors of the urban economy. Whilst, Todaro and Harris further argued that the push-pull model also accounts for the significant urban unemployment that is found in many less developed countries (Harris & Todaro, 1970). The authors show that it can be perfectly rational to migrate, despite urban unemployment or uncertainties in destination countries, due to a positive expected income differential between rural – urban centres and in more developed countries. Thus, rural and developing countries workforce will continue to be attracted by the possibilities of higher wage differential and migrate to the urban sector and core centres. They conclude that individuals and household will continue to be pulled to migrate until wage equalisation has taken place (Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro, 1970). Thus, this model has clear predictions and while the significance of income differentials is undisputable in migration decisions, it is probably not as excessive as Harris and Todaro describe it, since some of the model's extrapolations e.g. wage equalisation, have not empirically proven to be true (De Haas, 2010). Hence, Massey et al. (1993) state that such simplistic dichotomous explanations portend considerable limitations due to the failure in considering political and economic factors in international scene, and political decisions which directly or indirectly influences

migration decisions. In this vein, while still reliant on the push and pull causation of migration, the world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974), stresses the role of disruptions and dislocations in peripheral parts of the world that result from colonialism and the capitalist expansion of the core states' governments and multinationals. A strong immigrant labour demand in 'global' cities of the developed core states acts as a pull force for migration that attracts the highly skilled workforce of the periphery to the teeming markets of the imperialist industrial centres. However, a major critique of this theory rest on the assumptions that even though it follows the dynamics of market creation and structure of the global economy, individual and household motivations are not really considered. Therefore, micro mechanisms of migration are not clear. As such, (Kubursi, 2006) attempts to clear these complexities, when he asserts that when the prospects of future markets are non-existing, or if markets are incomplete, imperfect or inaccessible as is typically the setting in many developing economies, households who cannot access viable incomes and capital markets in the home country migration offers a particularly attractive and effective strategy for minimising risks and overcoming capital constraints for individuals and households. Therefore, relative deprivation as a result of periphery economy has a significant role in whether households will choose to send a migrant for earning abroad, and this lets us understand the explanation of migration from the world systems perspectives of dependency to individuals and households' level of decision making in the analysis of international migration (Kubursi 2006). In spite of the attraction that migration holds for citizens of developing countries such as Nigeria, the fact is that discontent from migration stems from brain drain and waste which occur when skilled migrants engage in menial occupations abroad, resulting in deskilling or when sold as slaves. While, brain gain can be achieved through the return of individuals who gained skills abroad through temporary migration but current economic depression prevents migrants from returning voluntarily except when compelled through deportation. The decision to migrate is thus rooted in resource availability disequilibrium, and presents migration mostly as survival decision.

V. MIGRATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

"In the 1970s, a group of ideologically inspired economists captured the ears and minds of politicians. The central thesis of their neo-liberal model was that growth and development depended on market competitiveness and the need to allow market principles permeate all aspects of life (Standing, 2011). This group disliked centralized government and envisioned the world as an open place, where investment, employment, and income would flow to where conditions were most conducive. The result of this vision was a more open world where labour could move from areas of least development to areas of more development made possible by the ease of transportation. The resultant migratory wave has created a class referred to by (Standing, 2011) as the world's precariat. They are responsible for global economic growth and gradually becoming its victims, demonised and scapegoated yet their crime being their quest for better well-being. The mobility of this category was made possible by globalisation. The international migration report estimates 244 million international migrants by 2015 (UN, 2016). According to the report, nearly two thirds (67%) live in Europe but originate from developing and middle income countries. The fact remains that manifestations of underdevelopment are among the root causes of international migration specifically push-factors such as income disparities between countries, socio-economic instability, and conflict including population pressures. International migration can adversely affect countries of origin through the loss of skilled human resources known as brain drain. Brain drain is seen as one of the most significant negative consequences of migration. For instance, according to Khadria (2002) out migration of IT professionals and graduates in this field is expected to have negative impact on technological development, as it will lead to an unavoidable shortage of high qualified specialists in that field. Nonetheless, winning can be in the form of brain gain that may improve productivity and the economy of the host nation or loss in the form of welfare for an additional unproductive individual within the confines of the host nation. On the other hand, the origin country may win through reduction of dependency of unproductive individuals and courtesy of remittances from emigrants, or be at loss due to brain drain of it elites and potentially productive workforce, with or without remittance, such loss will still be a substantive costly forgone alternative (De Haas, 2010).

Moreover, Lucas (2008) notes that the effect on the flow of migrants for the receiving country is rather complicated while in most cases the whole impact is not big. Lucas further noted that for some countries with an aging population it is a chance to fill the gap in the labour market, and temporary migrants are net contributors to the budget, as they pay taxes and do not receive anything for their retirement from the government of the host country because of their leaving back to their countries of origin after certain time. Besides this, he makes a point on the role of migrants in accelerating technical progress in destination countries citing the 2000 U.S. National Science Foundation estimates that shows that more than 35 percent of Ph.D. scientists and engineers in the United States were foreign born. Though, more generally, there is evidence to indicate that additions to human capital may have their biggest impact on growth through technical progress rather than through raising worker productivity (Lucas, 2008). Besides, when we look into the question of labour market and economic

impacts of immigrant workers for the natives in the host country, it is worth citing the work done by Chang (2007) where he argues the impact of immigrants in the labour market, we find that the natives of a host country, taken together, will gain from the immigration of labour. Wages may fall for those native workers who compete with immigrant labour, but this loss for those workers is a pure transfer among natives: it is offset by an equal gain for those who employ labour, and ultimately for consumers, who obtain goods and services at lower cost. Furthermore, natives gain surplus in excess of what they pay immigrants for their labour. Thus, natives as a group enjoy a net gain from employing immigrants. Besides, in receiving countries, migrant labourers are valuable for their several characteristics including working for lower wages, filling the gap in labour supply, limited social security payments, almost no cases of absenteeism and readiness for overtime work, and etc. (Beine et al., 2008). Experience shows that the movement of migrants from place of origin to destination is frequently accompanied with different difficulties such as financial, moral and psychological, cultural, health related problems and others (Adepoju et al., 2008). However, they can also be victims of violence from different people and even security personnel. A good example is the numerous incidences of xenophobia Nigerians have been subjected to in South Africa despite working only in the informal economy and the trending narrative of migrants being sold as slaves in Libya. During migration, individuals also have to cope with the complex process of separation from their families on the one hand, and adaptation to different living, working and cultural environment in the new country on the other hand. Other challenges include language barriers, sense of isolation and alienation, social role changes and identity crises, cultural conflicts and social discrimination and other potential sources of stress. Evidence from research shows that separation of children from parent(s) in migrants' families negatively impacts their school success and they are more likely to stay behind their peers and even drop out of school (Nnaemeka, 2005). Migrants also frequently suffer from fraud and non-payment of salaries as employers can confiscate passports of the migrant workers, refuse to pay salaries in part or in full and even detain them at the workplace (FIDH, 2011). Besides, women migrants are considered to be more vulnerable to different types of violence during travel and after arrival to destination communities and countries. Freedman and Jamal (2008) noted that such violence may occur due to policies within the larger social structures. Women's vulnerability to violence may be aggravated by their recruitment into often largely unskilled, low-paid and insecure occupation like prostitution and domestic work which to some extent are often illegal therefore having little or no social and legal protection. Castles (2000) contends that even though Governments of many immigrants' home countries have some kind of policies and mechanisms to prevent abuse and exploitation of their citizens in host countries and to render supports in cases of sickness, death, accidents and other situations. However, these measures and mechanisms cannot be effective because they are not provided to irregular migrants who mostly are those who find themselves in trouble.

VI. GLOBALIZATION AND MIGRATION

The work of (Czaika and Hein de Haas, 2014) has shown that the global migration map has become more skewed reflecting the asymmetric nature of the whole process. They posit that migration has become more diverse in terms of origins and destinations. The complexity of the migration process is not unconnected with globalisation against the hitherto pattern of a bilateral corridor based on colonial and other historical links. For instance, in the past migrants from Francophone countries moved to France while those from Anglophone countries sought solace in the United Kingdom (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007). In recent times, the migration pattern has become more diverse with migrants fanning out to Southern Europe, Asia and the Gulf states. Globalization, which is the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnectedness has engendered the ease of movement due to advances in transportation and communication technology. Globalization has increased migratory movement in the following ways: a. through the reduction in the costs of air travels. b. By strengthening migrant networks and transnational ties making it easier for migrants to remit money home. For instance, there is a large population of Nigerians in London, Italy, United States of America and South Africa. c. Access to information technology through the use of the internet and digital telephony and global satellite mobile (GSM) have increased the desire of people to seek better well-being in other parts of the world (see Attoh, 2010, Alabi, 2016). Fundamentally, the main trigger for globalisation is neo-liberalism which believes in a border-less world and perfect competition for goods and services. In addition, the growing inequality between the developed economies of the west and the developing economies has facilitated migration in huge numbers. Other factors include the demand for skilled and unskilled workers in the developed economies, authoritarian regimes, conflict and religious persecution. Significantly, the demand for semi-skilled and unskilled workers such as cleaners, housemaids and seasonal agricultural workers in the core north has an important impact. The underground economy is the largest employer of undocumented international migrants. The sweat shops, red light districts and the construction companies that rely mainly on outsourcing are the largest employers of undocumented migrants. The exploitation suffered by this category through low wages, no pension and healthcare help increase the wealth of such countries.

VII. MIGRATION AND ITS DISCONTENT

The wide spread belief that migrant workers take the jobs of natives, and that they are mostly the cause for increase in crime and social unrest in destination countries and labour migration follow the direction of developing to developed countries is more a fable than it is pragmatic. For example, while examining the nexus between migration and conflict, Barret (1993) contends that when migrants stay for extended periods in their host community, they become more assertive of their economic, political, and social rights which may evoke a reaction from the host community. Similarly, Mabogunje (1970) asserts that once migration has taken place, adjustments occur in both the areas of origin and destination. These adjustments, he opines, could be positive or negative as in encouraging more flow from the area of origin which heightens competition and also conflicts between the migrants and the natives of the host community. Nevertheless, some scholars assert that though migration engenders conflict, migration alone cannot be a sufficient reason or explanation of conflict generation. In this stance, Nnoli (1978) clarifies that it was not the contact between groups that in itself breeds inter-group conflicts but rather, the degree of competing claims among the groups. This degree of competing claim can be in the form of claims to agricultural land, political power distribution, economic resources, social amenities, and the preservation of primordial ties, etc. (Nnoli, 1978). Thus, migration, as a cause of conflict can only serve as a variable and not totally sufficient on its own to explain the incidences of conflict arising from inter-group contacts. This fear played out during the last United States of America presidential campaigns where the candidate of the Republican Party (Donald Trump) who is now President Trump accused Mexican migrants of bringing crime into the USA and taking over American jobs. This has resulted in a kind of backlash against migrants which incidentally has created a new generation of populist politicians in countries such as the United Kingdom with Brexit, France (Marine le Pen) and even Germany where candidates of so called nationalist parties blame migrants for their economic and political problems and envision a society without migrants.

Ardrey (1967) did contend that like lower animals, individuals and groups attempt to gain exclusive preserve of their 'territories,' since it is within such territory that the basic needs and interests of animals are satisfied. The animal (s) therefore defends such an area at all costs and strives to keep out those who they perceive might undermine their interests and needs. Therefore, the defence of territory within the context of migration encapsulates access to land, employment, wives, families, respect or preferential treatment and status, as well as one's national state and ethnic pride. Thus, if we defend the title to our land or the sovereignty of our country, we do it for reasons no different, no less innate, and no less ineradicable, than do lower animals (Ardrey, 1967). From the foregoing, conflict therefore erupts when the claims of one group to territory and status become incompatible with the desire of others to satisfy their own basic interests and needs within the same territoriality. Moreover, studies have shown that economic competition among rival groups produces hostile attitudes (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Van Houtum, 2010; Schapendonk, 2011). The participation of migrants may be considered as posing a threat to the livelihoods of indigenous people because migrants directly compete with them. Similarly, marginalised indigenous minorities are likely to perceive immigrant minorities as a salient threat to their already-tenuous positions in society resulting in the beliefs that migrant workers take the jobs of natives, and that they are mostly the cause of increase in criminality and social unrest. Also, consistent with the literature on economic competition and inter-group rivalry, local actors might face an incentive to exclude immigrants from their economic playing field to better bolster their chances of improving their economic situation (Quillian, 1995). As such, at the individual and group level, indigenous actors who compete with immigrants are more likely to adopt exclusionary or even violent behaviour toward migrants. This position is applicable to the numerous xenophobic attacks suffered by Nigerians in South Africa and currently in Libya where they have become victims of a thriving slave market. In most cases, the issues of employment, growing prosperity of the Nigerian migrant population and the growing attachment of native women to Nigerian affluent migrants have been salient issues.

From the Nigeria Immigration Services (NIS) records, there were approximately 1.81 million and 1.76 million Nigerian departures in 2012 and 2013, respectively. While in 2005 and 2006, 1.1 million and 2.6 million Nigerians left the country, respectively (Afolayan, 2009). Data for 2012 and 2013 indicate that a large number of Nigerians continue to go abroad for various reasons, even though the number seems to have dropped from the high peak reached in 2006 (Afolayan, 2009). Besides, the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) report indicates the existence of 1,497 illegal migration points into and out of the country, therefore, to a substantial extent, it is near impossible to curtail migratory pattern and provide accurate statistics of such migrations (Adegoke, 2016).

Table 1: Migration Statistics

	2012	2013
Arrivals		
Nigerian arrival (Return Migration)	1,495,045	1,578,715
Foreign arrival	803,463	956,081
Total arrival	2,298,508	2,53,796

Departures		
Nigerian departure	1,810,816	1,760,530
Foreign departure	839,957	861,240
Total departure	2,650,773	2,621,770

Source: Isiugo-Abanihe & IOM Nigeria, 2016

Furthermore, the remittance inflows from Nigerians abroad are a potential economic development tool. According to the World Bank, in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is the largest recipient of remittances, receiving nearly 65 per cent of officially recorded remittance flows to the region and 2 per cent of global inflows. The World Bank also ranked Nigeria fifth among the highest remittance-receiving countries in the world. Yet official data on remittances do not include monetary inflows through informal and unregulated channels, especially through friends returning to Nigeria and through goods sent to Nigeria which are readily converted into cash. In the same World Bank report, Nigerians received a total of 21 billion US dollars for the year 2012 (cited in Isiugo-Abanihe & IOM Nigeria, 2016).

Table 2: Remittances and other financial flows (in USD million)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Remittance inflows (RI)	19,200.00	18,432.00	19,814.40	20,606.98	20,527.92	20,776.32
Remittance outflows (RO)	23.28	28.71	29.04	32.51	24.22	27.60
Remittance net flows (RI – RO)	19,176.72	18,403.29	19,785.37	20,574.37	20,503.70	20,748.72
Remittance inflows (% of GDP)	9.37	11.07	8.76	8.48	7.97	7.71

Source: Isiugo-Abanihe & IOM Nigeria, 2016

The nation’s remittance regime for 2012 therefore doubled the 2008 figure of USD 10 billion, and is higher than the total Official Development Aid (ODA) to sub-Saharan Africa for 2010, which stood at USD 20.5 billion (cited in Isiugo-Abanihe & IOM Nigeria, 2016). These do not include monetary inflows through informal and unregulated channels. In fact, remittances sent by Nigerian migrants are believed to be about five times higher than the Official Development Aid (ODA) directed to the country (Adepoju, 2004). Also, the impact of migration on Nigeria goes beyond remittances, as it also creates employment and the exchange of skills, ideas and culture, as well as other gains associated with living abroad as some Nigerian doctors living in the USA organise delicate surgeries annually in the community of origin bringing in their American colleagues and rare medical equipments to assist such communities. Others bring in computers, text books and other teaching aids to enhance the quality of teaching in their Alma-mata or community of origin.

Bearing in mind the implications of migration, there is a general consensus that the benefits of migration, chiefly remittances pale in comparison to brain drain through emigration. Remittances in no way compensate for the loss of investment by sub-Saharan African countries and are by and large for private consumption rather than being reinvested (Stilwell et al., 2003). As to skills transfer and social remittances, there is little evidence to suggest that return migration by professionals is happening in any significant way, or that it is making an extensive and sustainable contribution to the development of developing countries such as Nigeria. Besides, De Haas (2008) makes a convincing case that 'turning the tide' on migration from the global South to North is a policy pipe dream, unlikely to be realised in the foreseeable future especially with growing income inequality and declining economic growth with attendant unemployment and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst, there are other negative impacts of migration, such as brain waste, loss of investment, trafficking or forced migration, prostitution as in the case of frequently reported cases of Nigerian ladies enslaved to underground sex work in Italy; Nigerian youths being sold as slaves in Libya, and those drowning in the Mediterranean Sea (Swing,2017). Other scholars allude to the transmission of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and other STIs as another social problem (Akeju&Temilola, 2016). Moreover, transmission of other viral diseases from returning migrants such as the Ebola index case to Nigeria is a serious threat. From the above, it can be argued that migration, whether international or internal, has both negative and positive impacts even though the deficits outweigh the benefits.

Increasingly, African political leaders have resorted to the use of ethnicity, nationalism and religion to reclassify long-standing residents as non-nationals. For instance, as earlier mentioned Nigerians and other black Africans living in South Africa and Libya are scapegoats in periods of economic recession and are accused of stealing jobs from nationals. They are also stigmatised as criminals, drug peddlers, philanderers and conduit for the spreading of diseases in places like Malaysia, India, and China etc., fanning public discontent among locals and driving a wedge between locals and Nigerian immigrants, which have led to not just to the clamouring for the expulsion of Nigerians and other fellow black immigrants, but also the actual maiming and killing of Nigerian migrants (Adepoju, 2003). More so, these worrisome negative stigma and indirect policy changes by

some governments against Nigerians, have caused Nigerian migrants to be compelled to either return to Nigeria or deported like filth or further emigrate to other regions of the world, in spite of globalisation and the free movement of persons' protocols within respective regional, continental and international migration and economic unions.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The possible impact of migration for the sending country means considerable loss of production potential, and at the same time, new financial flows to the country through remittances. For the receiving country, it provides cheap labour force which contributes to the creation of added value, as well as emergence of unemployment for local people; as they become less competitive from the point of their labour price. Also, immigrants may constitute real or allegedly new social problems for the host as evidenced in the new wave of terrorism sweeping through some countries in Europe. Whilst, looking into push factors of migration in Nigeria, unemployment, insecurity, depreciation of the national currency (Naira) and a myriad of other developmental crises seem to be the push factors. For instance, as urban unemployment rates are soaring and territorial violence disrupt livelihood, the experience of opportunities in foreign lands seem to be a push factor. Whilst, migration has intensified, making remittances at all cost an important livelihood strategy to many families in Nigeria the costs to the economy remain very high as agile youths are lost to the migration wave. Consequently, Nigeria is among the countries at the centre of debates and public concern in North America and Europe, and even in Africa in regard to migrants and integration issues, while countries like South Africans' xenophobia towards the economic advantage Nigerians create for themselves have resulted in violent attacks. The criminal gangs and militias in Libya have resorted to selling stranded migrants as slaves (CNN, December 29, 2017). The explanations of migration discontents are discussed in relation to local and global processes and their myriads of effects. In the light of the foregoing the following recommendations are made:

- The need to mainstream migrants into host communities to avoid the feeling of marginalization and alienation considering their contribution to host economies.
- The fact that sending country loses production potential as a result of migration should make host countries to view migrants in a positive light.
- Globalization has further exacerbated the inequality between countries by creating a core and periphery where the periphery sends cheap labour to the core. The UN should discourage the current migratory wave through the bridging of the inequality gap between countries by implementing a marshal plan for Africa.
- Nigerian government should encourage skilled workers remain in Nigeria by providing incentives to avoid brain waste.
- Bigotry and hate speeches should be condemned and sanctioned by the international community to avoid xenophobia and slavery like activities.

REFERENCES

- [1]. Adegoke, N. (2016). Migration and urbanisation and border security in Nigeria. In L. J. Oyefara (ed.) *Migration and urbanisation in contemporary Nigeria: Policy and Challenges*. Lagos: University of Lagos Press.
- [2]. Adepaju, A. (2003). Continuity and changing configurations of migration to and from the Republic of South Africa. *International Migration*, 41(1).
- [3]. Adepaju, A. (2004). Trend in international migration in and from Africa. In D. Massey & E. Taylor (eds.) *International migration prospects and policies in a global market*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [4]. Adepaju, A. (2006). *The challenge of labour migration flows between West Africa and the Maghreb*. International Migration Paper. Geneva: International Labour Organisation
- [5]. Adepaju, A., van Naerssen, T. & Zoomers, A., (2008). *International migration and national development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
- [6]. Adey, P. (2010). *Mobility*. London, UK: Routledge.
- [7]. Afolayan, A. (2009). *Migration in Nigeria: A country profile 2009*. Geneva: IOM.
- [8]. Afolayan, A. A., Ikuyatum, G. O. & Abejide, O. (2008). *Dynamics of international migration: A review of literature*. Paper prepared as part of the African perspectives of human mobility programme. Funded by MacAthur Foundation.
- [9]. Akeju, O. D. & Temilola, M. O. (2016). Migration, urbanisation and HIV/AIDS in Nigeria. In L. J. Oyefara (ed.) *Migration and urbanisation in contemporary Nigeria: Policy and Challenges*. Lagos: University of Lagos Press.
- [10]. Alabi, B. O. (2016). Urbanisation and labour migration in Nigeria. In L. J. Oyefara (ed.) *Migration and urbanisation in contemporary Nigeria: Policy and Challenges*. Lagos: University of Lagos Press.

- [11]. Attoh, F. C. N. (2009). Trafficking of Women in Nigeria: Poverty of Values or Inequality? (IJSS India-2009 Edition). Vol.9, No.3 (pp. 167 – 171).
- [12]. Attoh, F. C. N. (2010). Globalization and Trafficking in Young Women: insights from Benin City, Edo state by Franca Attoh in Globalization and Social Pathologies (eds) F.A.D. Oyekanmi, F. A. Badru and F. Bammeke (2010). Lagos, Sociology Department, University of Lagos.
- [13]. Attoh F.C.N. (2011) “Globalization, Gender Bias and Trafficking in Young Women: A Feminist Interpretation” in Olurode, ‘Lai (ed) (2009). Perspectives on Feminism from Africa. Carolina Academic Press.
- [14]. Albert, I. O. (1999). Ife-Modakeke crisis. In O. Otite& I. O. Albert (eds.) *Community conflicts in Nigeria: Management, resolution and transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum.
- [15]. Alhassan, A., Bashir, M., Balal, A. Sadiq, L. Umar, S. &Abah, H. (March 15, 2014). Non-boko haram violence plagues the Northern States. *Daily Trust (Weekly)*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/weekly/index.php/top-stories/15986-non-boko-haram-violence-plagues-northern-states>
- [16]. Amnesty International. (November, 2012). Nigeria: Trapped in the circle of violence. London: Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR44/043/2012/en/>
- [17]. Amuedo-Dorantes, C. &Poza, S. (2011). New evidence on the role of remittances on health care expenditures by Mexican households. *Review of Economics of the Household*, 9(1), 69-98.
- [18]. Anyanwu, J. (2011). International remittances and income inequality in Africa. Working Paper Series 135. Tunis: African Development Bank.
- [19]. Ardrey, R. (1967). *The territorial imperative: A personal inquiry into the animal origins of property and nations*. London: Collins.
- [20]. Badru, F. A. (2004). urbanization, family and social changes in Nigeria: 1950-1999. In M. O. A. Adejugbe (ed.) *Industrialisation, urbanisation and development in Nigeria 1950-1999*. Lagos: Concept Publications Limited.
- [21]. Barret, H. R. (1993). *Population geography: Conceptual framework in geography*. Essex: Oliver and Boyd.
- [22]. Beine, M., Docquier, F., and Rapoport, H. (2008). Brain drain and human capital formation in developing countries: Winners and losers. *Economic Journal*, 118(528), 631-652.
- [23]. Bouhga-Hagbe, J. (2006). *Altruism and workers’ remittances: Evidence from selected countries in the Middle East and Central Asia*. IMF Working Paper.
- [24]. Burke, C. (2008). *Smuggling versus trafficking: Do the U.N. Protocols have it right? Human Rights and Human Welfare*. University of Denver, Denver: Josef School of International Studies.
- [25]. Burns, P. &Gimpel, J. (2000). Economic insecurity, prejudicial stereotypes, public opinion on immigrant policy. *Political Science Quarterly*, 115(2).
- [26]. Caldwell, J.C. (1976). "Towards a restatement of demographic transition theory". *Population and Development Review*. Population Council. 2(3/4): 321-366.JSTOR.
- [27]. Carling, J. (2006). *Migration, human smuggling and trafficking from Nigeria to Europe*. Geneva: IOM
- [28]. Castles, S. (2000). International migration at the beginning of the twenty-first century: Global trends and issues. *International Social Science Journal*, 52(165).
- [29]. Chang, H. (2007). *The economic impact of international labour migration: Recent estimates and policy implications*. PA: University of Pennsylvania Law School.
- [30]. Davidson, B. (1965). *The growth of African civilisation: A history of West Africa 1000-1800*. London: Longmans.
- [31]. De Haas, H. (2008). *Irregular migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An overview of recent trends*. Geneva: IOM
- [32]. De Haas, H. (2010). Migration and development. A theoretical perspective. *Int. Migr. Rev.*, 44, 227–264.
- [33]. Eboraka, K. (2016). Migration and urbanisation in Nigeria: A historical and sociological overview. In L. J. Oyefara (ed.) *Migration and urbanisation in contemporary Nigeria: Policy and Challenges*. Lagos: University of Lagos Press.
- [34]. Faist, T. (2008). Migrants as transnational development agents: An inquiry into the newest round of the migration-development nexus. *Popul. Place Space*, 14, 21–42.
- [35]. Fergany, N. (2001). *Aspects of labour migration and unemployment in the Arab region*. Egypt: Almishkat Centre for Research.
- [36]. Freedman, J. & Jamal, B. (2008). *Violence against migrant and refugee women in the Euromed Region*. Copenhagen: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network.

- [37]. Goldenberg S. (2010). HIV vulnerability and migration in Americas. *Epidemiological Bulletin*. Retrieved from http://new.paho.org/bulletins/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=698&Itemid=272
- [38]. Harris, J. R. & Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: A two-sector analysis. *America Economic Review*, 60(1), 126–142.
- [39]. Heer, D. (2002). When cumulative causation conflicts with relative economic opportunity: recent change in the Hispanic population of the United States. *Migraciones Internacionales*, 1(3), 32-53.
- [40]. International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH, 2011). *Tajikistan: Exporting the workforce – at what price?* Retrieved from https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/taj_report-2.pdf
- [41]. Isiugo-Abanihe, U. C. & IOM Nigeria (2016). *Migration in Nigeria: A country profile 2014*. Abuja, Nigeria: International Organization for Migration.
- [42]. Jennissen, R. P. W. (2004). *Macroeconomic determinants of international migration in Europe*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Dutch University Press, Bloemgracht. Retrieved from <http://www.rug.nl/research/portal>
- [43]. Kelly, E. (2002). *Journeys of Jeopardy: A Review of Research on Trafficking in Women and Children in Europe*. Geneva: IOM.
- [44]. Khadria, B. (2002). *Skilled labour migration from developing countries: Study on India*. International Migration Papers 49. Geneva: International Labour Organisation.
- [45]. King, R. (2000). Generalisations from the history of return migration. In B. Ghosh (ed.) *Return Migration – Journey of Hope or Despair?* Geneva: IOM.
- [46]. Koser, K. (2010). Dimensions and dynamics of irregular migration. *Population, Space & Place*, 16, 181-193.
- [47]. Kubursi, A. (2006). The economics of migration and remittances under globalisation. Full and Productive Employment and Decent Work. *Dialogues at the Economic and Social Council*, 159-174.
- [48]. Levitt, P. & Lamba-Nieves, D. (2011). Social remittances revisited. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 37(1), 1–22.
- [49]. Lucas, R. (2008). *International labour migration in a globalising economy*. Trade, equity and development program, 92. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- [50]. Lurie, M. (2004). Migration, sexuality and the spread of HIV/AIDS in rural South Africa. *SAMP, Migration Policy Series*, 31.
- [51]. Mabogunje, A. (1985). *Foreword to provision of information for rural development*. Ibadan: Fountain Publication.
- [52]. Mabogunje, A. L. (1970). Systems approach to a theory of rural-urban migration. *Geographical Analysis*, 2(1).
- [53]. Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A. & Taylor, E. (1993). Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal. *Population and Development Review*, 19(3).
- [54]. Meyers, D. (1998). *Migrant remittances to Latin America: Reviewing the literature*. Retrieved from <http://archives.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/meyers.pdf>
- [55]. National Planning Commission. (2012). *National internal migration survey 2010*. Abuja: NPC
- [56]. Nnaemeka, C. (2005). *Analysis of impact of remittance on poverty and inequality in Nigeria. Research proposal submitted to poverty and economic policy*. Enugu: PMMA Network.
- [57]. Nnoli, O. (1978). *Ethnic politics in Nigeria*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
- [58]. Nwanna, C. R. (2004). Rural-Urban Migration and Population Problems in Nigeria cities. In M. O. A. Adejugbe (ed.) *Industrialisation, urbanization and development in Nigeria 1950-1999*. Lagos: Concept Publications Limited.
- [59]. Okeke, O. E. (2014). Conflicts between Fulani herders and farmers in Central and Southern Nigeria: Discourse on proposed establishment of grazing routes and reserves. *An International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, 3 (1), 66–84
- [60]. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (OECD, 2006). *International Migration Outlook 2006*. Geneva: OECD.
- [61]. Oyenyi, A. B. (2008). Nigeria in the organisation of Islamic countries. In J. Adekunle (ed.) *Religious politics in Nigeria*. Lagos: African World Press.
- [62]. Oyenyi, B. A. (2013). Internal migration in Nigeria: A positive contribution to human development. Lagos: International Organization for Migration (IOM) and ACP Observatory on Migration.
- [63]. Quillian, L. (1995). Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: Population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe. *American Sociological Review*, 60(4).
- [64]. Raghuram, P. (2009). Which migration, what development? Unsettling the edifice of migration and development. *Popul. Place Space*, 15, 103–117.
- [65]. Sabur, A. & Mahmud, H. (2008). Political impacts of remittances: A micro-level study of migrants' remittances in a village in Bangladesh. *Asian Social Science*, 4(12).

- [66]. Schapendonk, J. (2011). *Turbulent trajectories. Sub-Saharan African migrants heading north*. Nijmegen, The Netherlands: Radboud University Press.
- [67]. Shedrack, G. B., Alamijeabee, G. B. & Zainab, B. S. (1999). Communal conflicts and the possibilities of conflict resolution in Nigeria: A case study of the Tiv-Jukun Conflicts in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State. In O. Otite & I. O. Albert (eds.) *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, resolution and transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum.
- [68]. Skeldon, R. (2002). Migration and poverty. *Asia-Pacific Population Journal*, 17(4), 67-82.
- [69]. Skeldon, R. (2008). International migration as a tool in development policy: A passing phase? *Popul. Dev. Rev.*, 34, 1–18.
- [70]. Spallek, J., Zeep, H. & Razum, O. (2010) Prevention among immigrants: the example of Germany. *BMC Public Health*, 92(10), 1-6.
- [71]. Standing, G. (2011). *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. New York, Bloomsbury Academic Publishing Plc.
- [72]. Sugiyarto, G., Jha, S. & Ahmed, V. (2010). *Remittances and Household Welfare: A Case Study of Pakistan*. Asian Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/11540/1536>
- [73]. Swing, W. L. (2017). Interview with CNN International. London Studio.
- [74]. Todaro, M. (1969). A model of labour migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries. *The American Economic Review*, 59(1), 138–148.
- [75]. United Nations (2016). *International Migration Report 2015*. New York, UN.
- [76]. United States Bureau of Labour Statistics (2010). *Global Population Dynamics*, New York/
- [77]. Van Houtum, H. (2009). Human blacklisting: The global apartheid of the EU's external border regime. *Environ. Plan. D.*, 28, 957–976.
- [78]. Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The modern world system: Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world economy in the Sixteenth Century*. NY: Academy Press.
- [79]. Zanowiak, K. (2006). *NGO Assistance to Undocumented Migrants along the U.S. – Mexico Border*. Retrieved from <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/etext/llilas/ilassa/2007/zanowiak.pdf>
- [80]. Zoomers, A. & Nijenhuis, G. (2012). Does migration lead to development? Or is it contributing to a global divide? *Societies*, 2, 122–138.
- [81]. <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/14/Africa/Libya-migrant-auction>(accessed December 27, 2017).
- [82]. <https://qz.com/1145953/ghanas-president-akufo-addo-sl> (accessed December 27, 2017).

Franca Attah, PhD. " Mobility, Migration and Its Discontents: Insights from Nigeria." *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*. vol. 24 no. 03, 2019, pp. 43-54.